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Theories of economic institutions predict that complementarity exists between the nature of 
corporate governance of a firm and the nature of its human capital investment. The 
complementarity theory insists that the commitment of a firm and its employees to invest in 
firm-specific human capital will be reinforced by the commitment of the firm to adopt 
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. Using employer-employee matched data from 
the headquarters of large Japanese firms, this paper investigates the relationship between the 
wage-tenure profile of a firm and the nature of its corporate governance. Analysis of the 
wage-tenure profiles shows that firms with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance 
invest in firm-specific human capital more heavily than those with shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance. 
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I. Introduction 
Economists have been attracted by the relationship between corporate governance 
and human capital. Their main interest is that corporate governance, the way a firm is 
owned and controlled, is interrelated with human capital investment, the way employees 
are trained and paid. Comparing Japanese and British companies, Dore (1973) argued 
that corporate governance is interrelated with human capital accumulation. 
The relation between corporate governance and human capital investment has also 
attracted attention from business and political arenas. Since the 1990s, the view has 
been advanced—that shareholder-oriented corporate governance is essential to 
effectively motivate not only managements but also employees, and increase their 
efficiency. 
Theories of economic institution, developed by Aoki (1988) and Aoki and Okuno 
(1996), provide the theoretical basis for the complementarity between corporate 
governance and human capital investment. According to their theories, the firm is a 
nexus of contracts, and the nature of a firm’s subsystem such as human capital or 
corporate governance is not determined independently but in relation to other 
subsystems because of their complementarity. 
If the human capital investment of a firm is firm specific, a commitment by the 
employer and employees is required to sustain a long-term human capital investment 
program. The theory of complementarity predicts that the commitment to firm-specific 
human capital investment will be reinforced by another commitment by the firm to 
adopt stakeholder-oriented corporate governance, because the stakeholder oriented 
corporate governance also includes a commitment on the part of shareholders and 
managements to refrain from ex post exploitation of stakeholders’ quasi-rents. 
The purpose of this paper is to test the theory of complementarity between corporate 
governance and human capital investment by empirical analysis. Using 
employer-employee matched data from the headquarters of large Japanese firms, this 
paper investigates the relationship between the wage-tenure profile and the nature of the 
corporate governance of the firm. The findings of wage analyses are consistent with the 
theory of complementarity between stakeholder-oriented corporate governance and 
firm-specific human capital investment.   2
The next section briefly explains the theory of complementarity between corporate 
governance and human capital investment. Section III surveys the existing empirical 
literature that analyzes the relation between corporate governance and human capital 
investment. Section IV describes the data used in this study, and section V provides the 
results of the analysis of wage-tenure profiles. Section VI shows the conclusion of this 
study and proposes further discussion. 
 
II. Theory of Complementarity between Corporate Governance and 
Human Capital Investment 
Theories of economic institutions have developed since the 1980s on the basis of 
contract theories, finance theories, and human capital theories. The theory of 
complementarity between corporate governance and human capital enables economists 
to explain the variety of firms across various environments. The theory of 
complementarity, developed by Aoki (1988) and Aoki and Okuno (1996) insist that a 
firm is a composite of several subsystems and the nature of a subsystem is not 
determined independently but in relation to other subsystems. 
Each subsystem of the firm contains various contracts, many of which are, however, 
imperfect or implicit. The enforcement of these contracts is not necessarily guaranteed 
by laws, so there is room for opportunism or ex post exploitation. For example, once the 
employees of a firm agree to invest in firm-specific human capital, the employer can 
exploit the return on investment by reducing the wage of trained employees to the 
pre-trained level. 
In order to secure firm-specific human capital investment, a commitment to 
long-term cooperation is helpful, but not fully effective. In this case, the decision of the 
firm to adopt stakeholder-oriented corporate governance will reinforce the commitment 
to human capital investment, because stakeholder-oriented corporate governance 
includes the commitment not to exploit the stakeholders’ rents. 
The theory of complementarity between corporate governance and human capital, 
therefore, will lead to an empirical prediction that firms with stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance tend to invest more in firm-specific human capital because they 
have an advantage in committing not to exploit firm-specific investment by the 
employees. In contrast, firms with shareholder-oriented corporate governance will have   3
difficulty in committing to long-term cooperative contracts with employees, and 
therefore their human capital investment tends to be more in general skills. 
Next, we need to know what differences will be empirically observed in 
wage-tenure profiles when human capital investment is general or firm specific. Human 
capital theory maintains that the cost of general human capital investment is financed by 
employees, and the return on the investment is attributed to them (Becker 1964). Where 
the human capital is general, therefore, the firm’s wage-tenure profile will have three 
characteristics, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. First, the wage during the training period is 
lower compared to firms without training, because training costs are deducted from 
gross productivity. Second, the wage-tenure profile has a steep slope in the early career 
of employees, when training costs decrease and productivity increases along with the 
tenure. Third, the wage-tenure profile in their later career will be saturated and not 
necessarily grow as long as senior workers acquire little additional skill. 
Where the human capital investment is firm specific, the wage-tenure profile should 
have a different form. As Hashimoto (1981) points out, where firm-specific human 
capital investment is financed and owned by the firm, as shown in Figure 3, trained 
employees can demand wage increase, even threatening to quit and, thus, damage the 
human capital. Hashimoto therefore argues that firm-specific human capital should be 
accumulated through shared investment by both employers and employees, as shown in 
Figure 4. In addition, in order to prevent employees from shirking and quitting, both 
employers and employees can agree that the wage will be increased in the later career 
years of the employees (Lazear 1979). The wage-tenure profile in the firms with 
firm-specific human capital will then have the following three characteristics: First, the 
wage paid during the training period is higher than the wage paid by firms with general 
training because the training cost is shared by the firms and employees. Second, the 
wage-tenure profile has a flatter slope in the early career years, when training costs and 
productivity gain are shared. Third, the wage-tenure profile in the later career years will 
not be saturated and may continue to grow because of the deferred payments. The 
empirical analysis of this paper investigates whether firms with stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance have wage profiles with the characteristics of the firm-specific 
investment. 
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III. Existing Empirical Literature 
There exists literature on the relationship between corporate governance and human 
capital—Gospel and Pendleton (2003), Jacoby (2005), and Konzelmann et al. (2006), 
for example. However, empirical analysis of the relationship is limited and mainly 
focuses on employment adjustment in Japan. Abe (2002), using data on listed firms in 
the chemical, iron and steel, electronic manufacturing, and retail and wholesale 
industries for the period 1978 to 1995, finds that the presence of large shareholders and 
high degrees of cross shareholding slow down the speed of employment adjustment. 
Noda (2006) analyzes the panel data on the listed Japanese firms in the electric and 
machinery industries and finds that firms with insider top management tend to adjust 
their employment more slowly. Noda (2007) also finds that an increase in the ratio of 
insider appointment as executive officers tends to lower the probability of employment 
adjustment. Similarly, Abe and Shimizutani (2007), with a dataset of large Japanese 
firms, find that outside directors are more inclined to implement layoffs and voluntary 
or early retirement, while insiders are more likely to decrease new hiring and protect 
incumbent employees. 
There are few studies on the relationship between corporate governance and human 
resource management practices. Examining the data on 58 listed Japanese companies, 
Abe and Hoshi (2004) find that firms with non-traditional Japanese-style ownership 
structures (especially high foreign ownership) seem to have more non-traditional human 
resource management practices. On the basis of the questionnaire data for Japanese 
companies, Hoshi (2007) finds that a firm that regards its employees as important 
stakeholders tends to consider training as an obligation of the firm. Using the same data 
set, Abe (2007) finds that firms with concentrated shareholders tend to retain the 
practice of traditional lifetime employment. He also finds that firms with high foreign 
shareholding tend to believe that each employee should take the initiative to undergo 
training in the near future. 
Existing empirical literature on employment adjustment and human resource 
management practices implies that there could be a link between the corporate 
governance of a firm and its human capital. In order to test for the complementarity 
between stakeholder-oriented corporate governance and firm-specific human capital   5
investment, the most effective way should be to analyze wage profiles across firms with 
different corporate governance orientations. There is no existing literature, however, 




1. Employer-Employee Matched Data 
The data used in this study is constructed from the questionnaires titled 
“Management Strategy, Corporate Governance, and Human Resource Management for 
the New Century,” administered by the Japan Institute for Labor in 1999. The first wave 
of the survey was sent to the headquarters of Japanese firms that employ more than 
1,000 workers, asking respondents about their business strategies and corporate 
governance. The second wave of the survey, with questions on wages and other 
personnel and human resource topics, was sent to employees of the headquarters’ five 
divisions (the sales planning division, the personnel division, the management planning 
division, the general affairs division, and the accounting division). Employer-employee 
matched data is then constructed by combining the first and second waves of the survey. 
The matched data contains information on 3,491 employees from 522 firms. 
The advantage of this data set is that it can match the data of the corporate 
governance of a firm and the data of the wage and other personnel information of 
individual employees of the firm. Another advantage is that the employees in this data 
set are homogeneous because the second set of the questionnaires were sent to 
comparable employees of comparable divisions of the headquarters of each firm. 
  
2. Variables Representing Corporate Governance Orientation 
The stakeholder-oriented corporate governance, modeled by Aoki (1988) and Aoki 
and Okuno (1996), and the neoclassical shareholder-oriented corporate governance have 
some contrasting features. In firms with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance, 
shareholders’ control over the firm is limited explicitly or implicitly. Executive officers 
and board directors are often promoted from the employee ranks and emphasize the 
interest of employees. Employees play central roles of the residual claimer, and   6
therefore share the risk and returns of the business with the shareholders. 
In order to measure the stakeholder orientation of the corporate governance of each 
firm, this study constructs five variables from the headquarters survey. The variables 
representing the stakeholder orientation of corporate governance are the ratio of stable 
shareholders, the absence of stock option plans for the management, profit sharing plans 
in which the wage level of the firm moves up and down with medium- and long-term 
business performance, compulsory retirement age for board directors, and monopoly 
over major management positions by insider employees. 
The first variable, the ratio of stable shareholders, is the ratio of voting rights held 
by friendly stable shareholders. The variable is constructed based on the answer of the 
firm’s headquarters, and takes continuous value from 0 to 1, taking 1 when all of the 
shares are held by friendly stable shareholders and 0 when there is no stable shareholder. 
Stable shareholders are usually trading partners, employee stock ownership plan funds, 
financial institutions, and group companies of the same keiretsu. They often submit the 
proxy for their shares to the CEO of the firm. The ratio of stable shareholders can 
represent the restraint of shareholders and the stakeholder orientation in corporate 
governance. 
The second variable, the absence of stock option plans for the management, takes 1 
when the firm has no stock option plan for the management and 0 when the firm has 
stock option plans. Stock option plans for the management are considered a good 
remedy for agency problems between the shareholders and management. The existence 
of stock option plans, therefore, implies that the management is strongly motivated by 
the interest of shareholders. 
The third variable, profit sharing, is constructed based on the answer of the firm’s 
headquarters. The variable takes 1 if the firm has a wage policy to couple the wage and 
the medium- and long-term business performance of the firm. If the wages of the 
employees are determined by the market rate, the employees have no stake in the firm’s 
performance. In contrast, if the wages of employees increase or decrease along with the 
ups and downs in the medium- and long-term business performance, the risk and return 
of the business are attributed to the employees. In this case, the employees are 
stakeholders, and their role comes closer to that of the residual right claimer or the 
owner of the firm.   7
The fourth variable takes 1 if the firm has a compulsory retirement age for board 
directors. The rule that board members, including the CEO, must retire at a certain age 
has the effect of decreasing the power of the directors and the CEO. A typical manner of 
corporate control under this rule is that each of the board members stays in power for 
two to four years only and the continuous need for new board members are met by 
promotion of insider employees. 
The fifth variable, monopoly over major management positions by insider 
employees, takes 1 if major management positions such as the managers of planning, 
finance, sales, personnel, production, and purchasing are monopolized by the employees 
who rose through the ranks after joining the firm upon graduation. Prohibiting outsiders 
from occupying any of the important management positions means that outside 
shareholders have little access to the management of corporate operations. 
These five variables will represent the stakeholder orientation of the firm’s corporate 
governance. Each variable takes 1 when the governance is stakeholder oriented and 0 
when the governance is shareholder oriented. 
 
3. Wages, Attributes, and Subjective Productivity of Employees 
This research collects data on wages of employees and attributes such as tenure, 
experience, education, sex, and the industry and division they are working for from 
questionnaires to employees. 
We also construct a qualitative variable of the subjective wage-productivity 
difference (SWPD) of each employee. The variable is based on the answer to a question 
asking the employees to compare their wage and productivity. The variable takes three 
qualitative stages; takes 1 when the employees consider that their wage is higher than 
their productivity, takes 2 when their wage is equal to their subjective productivity, and 
takes 3 when their wage is lower than their subjective productivity. 
 
V. Empirical Specification and Results 
1. Empirical Specification 
The analysis of this study is performed by estimating the wage equation, which 
includes the effects of corporate governance on human capital accumulation. The wage   8
takes the semi-logarithmic form with the common explanatory variables of tenure, 
tenure squared, experience, experience squared, sex, education level, industry, and 
occupation. Then, we add the five variables that represent stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance: CG1 for the ratio of the stable shareholders, CG2 for the absence 
of stock option plans for the management, CG3 for profit sharing with the wage 
reflecting business performance, CG4 for compulsory retirement age for board directors, 
and CG5 for monopoly over major management positions by insider employees. The 
wage equation includes these five variables, the interaction of each of the five variables 
and the tenure, and the interaction of each of the five variables and the tenure squared. 
The empirical specification is therefore as follows: 
ln(wage) =β1ten + β2ten2 + β3exp + β4exp2 
 +  γ1CG1 + γ2CG2 + γ3CG3 + γ4CG4 + γ5CG5 
 +  (γ11CG1 +γ12CG2 +γ13CG3 + γ14CG4 +γ15CG5)*ten 
 +  (γ21CG1 + γ22CG2 + γ23CG3 + γ24CG4 + γ25CG5)*ten2 
 +  ζX +εi 
where wage represents the annual wage, ten represents the tenure, exp represents the 
experience since the employee graduates from school, and X represents other attributes 
of employees, such as education level, industry, occupation, and sex. 
We also estimate an ordered logit model to explain a subjective wage-productivity 
difference (SWPD). As noted in the previous section, the SWPD takes three qualitative 
stages. The explanatory variables of the ordered logit are the same as the wage equation. 
SWPD    = F(z),    F = 1, 2, or 3 
z =β’1ten + β’2ten2 + β’3exp + β’4exp2 
 +  γ’1CG1 + γ’2CG2 + γ’3CG3 + γ’4CG4 + γ’5CG5 
 +  (γ’11CG1 +γ’12CG2 +γ’13CG3 + γ’14CG4 +γ’15CG5)*ten 
 +  (γ’21CG1 + γ’22CG2 + γ’23CG3 + γ’24CG4 + γ’25CG5)*ten2 
 +  ζ’X +εi’ 
The ordered logit model captures the tenure profile of SWPD of employees working 
for firms with different corporate governance orientation.   
 
2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data set. The average ratio of stable   9
shareholders is 63 percent. Of the sampled employees, 73 percent are working for firms 
with no stock option plan for management. Eighty one percent of the sampled 
employees work for firms with a profit-sharing wage policy. Half of the sampled 
workers belong to firms with a compulsory retirement age for board members. Seventy 
four percent of the sampled workers work for firms in which all major management 
positions are exclusively occupied by insiders. 
The average annual wage is 6,150,000 yen, average experience 15.5 years, and 
average tenure 13.5 years. As for their education, 15 percent of them are high school 
graduates, 14 percent are politech or junior college graduates, and 69 percent university 
graduates. Males comprise 74 percent and females 26 percent of the sampled employees. 
The report of subjective wage-productivity difference indicates that 38.4 percent of the 
sampled employees indicate that their wage is lower than their productivity, 55.3 
percent that their wage is equal to their productivity, and 6.3 percent that their wage is 
higher than their contributions. 
 
3. The Estimation of Wage Equation with Corporate Governance Variables 
Table 2 provides the estimation results of the estimation of the wage equations with 
the corporate governance variables. Figure 5 shows two wage-tenure profiles, the 
triangular dot line is calculated with all of the five corporate governance variables 
assumed to be 1 and the square dot line, with the corporate governance variables 
assumed to be 0. They show that the effects of the corporate governance variables are 
generally consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
The intercept coefficient of “stable shareholders” is positive and significant, while 
the intercept coefficients of other governance variables are insignificant. This result 
implies that the wage level of new graduates hired by firms that are owned by stable 
shareholders is 7.6 percent higher than that of their counterparts hired by the firms with 
no stable shareholders. 
The coefficients of all of the interaction terms of the five corporate governance 
variables and the tenure are negative, and four of the five coefficients are significant. 
These negative interaction coefficients mean that wage growth is slower during the 
employees’ earlier career years in firms where the corporate governance is stakeholder 
oriented. That is, these firms have a relatively more firm-specific human capital   10
investment and, therefore, share more of the cost of and return on human capital 
investment than shareholder-governed firms do. 
The coefficients of the interaction terms of stakeholder-oriented corporate 
governance variables and the tenure squared are positive, and four of the five 
coefficients are significant. These positive coefficients indicate that wage-tenure profiles 
of firms with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance saturate more gradually than 
those of firms with a shareholder-oriented approach. The wage growth rate in firms 
where corporate governance is stakeholder oriented is higher than the rate in firms with 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance with tenures of 17 years and more. This 
result implies that wage-tenure profiles of firms with stakeholder-oriented corporate 
governance are characterized by deferred payments. 
The estimated wage-tenure profiles show that in firms with stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance the wage is relatively higher in the freshman year. However, wage 
growth is slow in the early career years, but will continue and saturate rather slowly in 
the later career years. These characteristics of estimated wage-tenure profiles are 
consistent with firm-specific human capital investment shared by both employees and 
firms with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. 
 
4. Subjective Wage-Productivity Difference 
Next, we will reinforce the above results by observing the tenure profile of the 
subjective wage-productivity differences (SWPD). The wage analysis of this paper does 
not necessarily guarantee that firms with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance 
invest in firm-specific human capital. If the cost of and return on human capital 
investment are shared by the employers and employees, this should generate a gap 
between the productivity of workers and the wages they receive, especially in the 
post-trained period. A supplementary analysis of subjective wage-productivity 
differences (SWPD) in the tenure profile is shown in Table 3 and Figure 6. Figure 6 
shows two subjective wage-productivity differences, the triangular dot line is calculated 
with all of the five corporate governance variables are assumed to be 1 and the square 
dot line is calculated with these variables to be 0. The estimation results show that in 
firms with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance employees with tenures of 0 to 25 
years tend to feel that their productivity is higher than their wages.   11
 
V. Conclusion and Discussion 
The empirical analysis of this paper finds that wage-tenure profiles of firms with 
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance are characterized by shared investments in 
firm-specific human capital. This is consistent with the prediction of the theories of 
economic complementarities that stakeholder-oriented corporate governance can 
reinforce the commitment that is needed to sustain shared investments in firm-specific 
human capital. 
The results of this paper support the theory of complementarity among the 
subsystems of economic institutions. This implies that a legal or environmental change 
that makes a small difference in one subsystem of the economy may affect other 
subsystems and bring the economy to a totally different equilibrium. At any rate, 
changes in corporate finance or corporate governance will certainly influence the way 
human capital is accumulated. A shift to shareholder-oriented corporate governance, for 
example, may lead to general human capital investments financed mainly by employees. 
Complementarity of economic subsystems, as discussed in this paper, could be 
operating in other subsystems of the economy as well. Development of new 
good-quality data sets will certainly help promote empirical analysis in order to examine 
whether complementarities among economic subsystems exist and, thus, enrich our 
understanding of the economy and economics.   12
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Figure 1. Wage and Productivity with No Training 
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Figure 2. Wage and Productivity with General Training 
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Figure 3. Wage and Productivity with Firm-Specific Training 
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Figure 4. Wage and Productivity with Firm-Specific Training by Shared Investment 
 





Wage       : broken line
 
   18
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
NM e a n S t d .  D e v . M i n M a x
Corporate Governance
Stable Shareholders 3491 0.63 0.29 0 1
Lack of Stock Option 3491 0.73 0.44 0 1
Profit Shareing 3491 0.81 0.39 0 1
Compulsory Retire of Directors 3491 0.50 0.50 0 1
Monopoly of Management by Insiders 3491 0.74 0.44 0 1
Personnel Attributes
Annual Wage 3491 615 275 250 1800
Subjectibe Wage-Producitivity Gap 3477 2.32 0.59 1 3
Experience 3491 15.5 9.4 0 52
Tenure 3491 13.5 8.9 0 49
High School Grad 3491 0.15 0.35 0 1
Politech Grad 3491 0.14 0.34 0 1
University Grad 3491 0.69 0.46 0 1
Graduate School 3491 0.02 0.13 0 1
Foreign MBA 3491 0.00 0.04 0 1
Others 3491 0.00 0.06 0 1
Occupations
Sales Division 3491 0.16 0.36 0 1
Personnel Division 3491 0.21 0.40 0 1
Planning Division 3491 0.21 0.40 0 1
General Affairs Department 3491 0.19 0.39 0 1
Accounting Section 3491 0.22 0.41 0 1
Industry
Construction 3491 0.11 0.31 0 1
Manufacturing 3491 0.40 0.49 0 1
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply and Watar 3491 0.02 0.15 0 1
Transport and Communications 3491 0.11 0.31 0 1
Wholesale 3491 0.06 0.24 0 1
Retail Trading 3491 0.10 0.29 0 1
Finance and Insurance 3491 0.08 0.27 0 1
Real Estate 3491 0.01 0.09 0 1
Service 3491 0.13 0.33 0 1
Sex
Male 3491 0.74 0.44 0 1
Female 3491 0.26 0.44 0 1
Variables
   19
 
Table 2. Wage Equasion with Corporate Governance Variables
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Experience 0.0438 15.30 *** 0.0443 15.58 ***
Experience Squared -0.0006 -9.00 *** -0.0006 -9.18 ***
Tenure 0.0505 8.11 *** 0.0437 10.66 ***
Tenure Squared -0.0011 -6.14 *** -0.0010 -6.88 ***
Stable Shareholders 0.0760 2.17 **
Stable Shareholders * Tenure -0.0146 -3.04 *** -0.0056 -2.35 **
Stable Shareholders * Tenure Squared 0.0005 3.90 *** 0.0003 3.47 ***
Lack of Stock Option -0.0259 -1.12
Lack of Stock Option * Tenure -0.0024 -0.73 -0.0054 -3.42 ***
Lack of Stock Option * Tenure Squared 0.0001 0.61 0.0001 2.04 **
Profit Shareing 0.0284 1.11
Profit Shareing * Tenure -0.0101 -2.86 *** -0.0068 -3.87 ***
Profit Shareing * Tenure Squared 0.0003 2.77 *** 0.0002 2.97 ***
Compulsory Retire of Directors 0.0227 1.10
Compulsory Retire of Directors * Tenure -0.0065 -2.26 ** -0.0037 -2.67 **
Compulsory Retire of Directors * Tenure Squared 0.0002 2.04 ** 0.0001 1.87 *
Monopoly of Management by Insiders -0.0111 -0.49
Monopoly of Management by Insiders * Tenure -0.0084 -2.50 ** -0.0098 -5.70 ***
Monopoly of Management by Insiders * Tenure Squared 0.0002 2.24 ** 0.0003 3.71 ***
Female -0.2355 -21.42 *** -0.2346 -21.34 ***
Constant 5.6501 131.36 *** 5.7036 347.82 ***
Sample size 3491 3491
F-value 305.38 350.9
Prob > F 0.00 0.00
Adj R-squared 0.77 0.77
Note: ***, **, and * represent the significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
       All specifications are controlled for the industry, occupation, and educational level but 
      the coefficients are suppressed.  
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Table 3. Subjective Wage Productivity Difference
Variables
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Experience 0.078 0.027 *** 0.081 0.027 ***
Experience Squared -0.002 0.001 *** -0.002 0.001 ***
Tenure -0.133 0.058 ** -0.163 0.038 ***
Tenure Squared 0.004 0.002 ** 0.005 0.001 ***
Stable Shareholders -0.092 0.322
Stable Shareholders * Tenure 0.039 0.044 0.029 0.022
Stable Shareholders * Tenure Squared -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 **
Lack of Stock Option 0.128 0.213
Lack of Stock Option * Tenure -0.004 0.030 0.011 0.014
Lack of Stock Option * Tenure Squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Profit Shareing 0.389 0.239 *
Profit Shareing * Tenure 0.015 0.033 0.061 0.016 ***
Profit Shareing * Tenure Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 ***
Compulsory Retire of Directors 0.005 0.189
Compulsory Retire of Directors * Tenure 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.013 **
Compulsory Retire of Directors * Tenure Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 *
Monopoly of Management by Insiders -0.157 0.210
Monopoly of Management by Insiders * Tenure 0.048 0.031 0.028 0.016 *
Monopoly of Management by Insiders * Tenure Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001




Sample size 3477 3477
F-value (LR chi2) 169.95 166.24
Prob > F (Prob > chi2) 0.00 0
Adj R-squared (Pseudo R2) 0.03 0.03
Log likelihood -2935.59 -2937.45
Note: ***, **, and * represent the significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
       All specifications are controlled for the industry, occupation, and educational level but the coefficients
      are suppressed.
　　　 The Specification (1) and (2) are estimated by Ordered Logit.
       "Subjective Wage Productivity Difference" in coloum (1) and (2) is based on the answer to the questionnaire
      asking the employees to compare their wage and productivity. The variable takes 3 when the employees
      consider that their wage is higher than their productivity, takes 2 when their wage is equal to their subjective
      productivity, and takes 1 when their wage is lower than their subjective productivity. 
(1)Ordered Logit (2)Ordered Logit
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Figure 6. Subjective Wage Productivity Difference 
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